Tag Archives: Stimson Center

Rebuttal of the 6 most popular myths about nuclear weapons

As it continues to campaign for deep cuts in America’s defenses, the Left has particularly aimed its arrows at the US nuclear deterrent, which protect America and over 30 of its allies against the most catastrophic threats: a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack; a large-scale conventional attack; and nuclear proliferation. It is the most effective nonproliferation program ever enacted.

It is falsely claimed that:

1)      Nuclear weapons are irrelevant in the 21st century security environment. They are relics of the Cold War.

2)      A “world without nuclear weapons” is both realistically attainable and desirable.

3)      The nuclear triad is too expensive and not worth the cost.

4)      The entire nuclear arsenal is too expensive and siphons money away from other defense programs.

5)      Conventional weapons, missile defense systems, and cyberweapons can replace nuclear weapons in a very wide range of missions and scenarios and against the vast majority of targets.

6)      The fewer nuclear weapons the US has, the better; cutting America’s nuclear deterrent makes America safer.

Let’s deal with these myths one after another.

Myth #1: Nuclear weapons are irrelevant in the 21st century security environment. They are relics of the Cold War.

The facts: Nuclear weapons are HIGHLY RELEVANT in the 21st century security environment. They protect America and all of its allies against the following three, potentially catastrophic, security threats: a nuclear/chemical/biological attack, a large-scale conventional attack, and nuclear proliferation.

megoizzy (CC)

megoizzy (CC)

The US nuclear arsenal is the most effective counter-proliferation program ever created. It has discouraged all of America’s allies except Britain and France from developing nuclear weapons, reassuring them that they don’t need to do so because the US provides a powerful nuclear umbrella to them. Such an umbrella is ESPECIALLY needed now – more than ever – given the nuclear threats posed by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran.

Russia has 2,800 strategic nuclear warheads (including 1,550 deployed) and up to 4,000 tactical warheads – and the means to deliver all 6,800 if need be. Its 434 ICBMs can collectively deliver 1,684 warheads to the CONUS; its 14 ballistic missile submarines can deliver over 2,200 warheads to the CONUS (while sitting in their ports); and each of its 251 strategic bombers can carry up to 7 warheads (1 freefall bomb and 6 nuclear-tipped cruise missiles). Its Tu-95 bomber fleet alone can deliver over 700 warheads to the middle of America.

China has at least 1,800, and up to 3,000, nuclear warheads, and the means to deliver 1,274 of them. Among these are almost 70 ICBMs, 120-140 MRBMs, over 1,600 SRBMs, dozens of land-attack cruise missiles, six ballistic missile submarines, and 440 nuclear-capable aircraft. While the vast majority of its SRBMs and cruise missiles are reportedly conventionally-armed at present, they could be armed with nuclear weapons anytime, which is called “breakout capability.”

Then there’s North Korea with its nuclear arsenal (which it has announced it will grow) and ICBMs capable of reaching the US, and Iran, which is coming closer to achieving nuclear weapon status everyday.

Besides deterring nuclear attack, nuclear weapons also protect America’s treaty allies against a large-scale conventional attack – ensuring that it has never happened so far.

Myth #2: A “world without nuclear weapons” is both realistically attainable and desirable. 

The facts: A world without nuclear weapons (“Global Zero”) is neither achievable nor desirable. Not achievable, because no other country in the world is following America’s disarmament “example” (and foreign countries don’t care about America’s “examples”; they care only about their self-interest). No other country is following the US on the road to “Global Zero”. Accordingly, there will NEVER be a world without nuclear weapons.

Russia has recently declared it will not cut its nuclear arsenal nor enter into any negotiations to that end. It is actually building UP its arsenal (as allowed to do so by the New START) and modernizing it. China, which has up to 3,000 nuclear warheads, is also rapidly building up and modernizing its arsenal, and refusing to even disclose its size or enter into any talks – let alone formal treaty negotiations – about it. Likewise, India and Pakistan refuse to join the Nonproliferation Treaty, disclose the size of their arsenals, or enter into any talks – let alone arms control treaties – pertaining to these arsenals. Ditto North Korea, which has recently announced it will NEVER give up its nuclear arsenal and that, if anything, it will INCREASE its size and restart the Yongboyng reactor to harvest plutonium from spent fuel rods.

So NO nuclear power wants to join the West in its suicidal nuclear disarmament quest. None whatsoever. Not Russia, not China, not India and Pakistan, not North Korea. And, of course, Iran is racing towards nuclear power status.

Even Bruce Blair, a supporter of America’s nuclear disarmament, testified recently before the House Armed Services Committee on March 19th that even if America cut its nuclear arsenal deeply, e.g. along the lines of what his organization (Global Zero) proposes, NOBODY would reciprocate. (1:04:41)

Which is true – Russia, China, North Korea, India, Pakistan, etc., are all refusing to even cut, let alone eliminate, their nuclear arsenals. Obama has NO followers on the road to his totally unrealistic goal of “global zero”. There will never be a “global zero.”

Nuclear weaponry is a genie that cannot be put back into the bottle. It cannot be “un-invented” or banished from the face of the Earth, contrary to the unrealistic dreams of several US Presidents, including Ronald Reagan (this shows that, alas, Reagan wasn’t perfect and had some flaws).

Nor would a “nuclear-free world” be safer and more peaceful than it is now, contrary to Obama’s false claims that the US should “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” On the contrary, it would be less peaceful and secure.

Humanity lived through “Global Zero” – in a world without nukes – for almost its entire history from its dawn to 1945. During that time, there were numerous and horribly destructive wars between the great powers of the time, each one leading to huge casualties among combatants and civilians and to great destruction. Examples included the Peloponesian war, Rome’s wars of conquest, the Hundred Years War, the Wars of Religion, the Thirty Years War, the Seven Years’ War, the Napoleonic Wars, and of course, the two World Wars. Not to mention the numerous bloody civil wars such as those in the US (1861-1865) and Russia (1918-1923).

5 million people, including 1 million Frenchmen, died in the Napoleonic Wars. Proportionally to the populations of today, that would be 50 million Europeans, including 10 million Frenchmen. French casualties in these wars were 14% higher than in WW1. In that war alone, about 10 million people died; in World War 2, over 60 million, and its perpetrators attempted the extermination of entire nations (peoples) and even races. The sheer barbarity and murder witnessed during that war is unmatched by any conflict before or after that war.

Since 1945, however – the advent of nuclear weapons – there has been NO war between the great powers. And it is mostly, if not entirely, because of nuclear weapons, which have moderated their behavior and forced them to accept coexistence with each other even if they have diametrically opposed ideologies. Nuclear weapons have taught them that even the most difficult compromise is better than a nuclear exchange.

Nuclear weapons have not ended war completely – no invention will ever do that – but they have eliminated great power wars. All wars since 1945 have been either between smaller, non-world-power countries (e.g. conflicts between Israel and its Arab neighbors), or between a world power and a weaker country (e.g. Iraq, Vietnam), or between a country and an insurgency (e.g. the US vs the Taleban).

Such conflicts have a much smaller scale, body count, and destructive power than great power wars. Since WW2, there hasn’t been a conflict even approaching the sheer barbarity and destruction of WW2, and it is mostly, if not entirely, due to nuclear weapons.

Instead of seeking their scrapping, we should all learn to love them.

Myth #3: The nuclear triad is too expensive and not worth the cost.

The facts: The nuclear triad is NOT too expensive and is well worth the cost. The ICBM leg of the nuclear triad – the cheapest, most ready, most responsive, and most dispersed leg – costs only $1.1 bn per year to maintain; the bomber leg, only $2.5 bn per year. The entire nuclear arsenal, including all the warheads, missiles, bombers, submarines, supporting facilities, and personnel costs only $32-38 bn per year to maintain, which is only 6.3% of the entire military budget ($611 bn in FY2013, pre-sequestration).

For that low cost, taxpayers get a large, diverse, survivable nuclear triad capable of surviving even a large-scale first strike and of striking anywhere in the world with any needed measure of power. A triad that gives the President huge flexibility in where, when, and how to strike; a triad that keeps the enemy guessing as to how the US would retaliate.

As Robert Kaplan says, “Don’t give your enemy too few problems to solve because if you do, he’ll solve them.”

Without the ICBM leg, the enemy would have to destroy only 2 submarine bases, 3 bomber bases, and any SSBNs that would be on patrol. WITH the ICBM leg still existing, the enemy would also have to make sure he destroys every single USAF ICBM silo; there are 450, and the USAF may have built decoy siloes.

Numbers don’t lie. Liberals do.

Without a triad, the nuclear deterrent would’ve been much less survivable than it is. This will be even MORE important as the arsenal is cut to even lower, post-New-START, levels.

A nuclear triad is the most survivable and most flexible nuclear arsenal arrangement ever invented, which is why the US, Russia, China, and Israel all have it, and why India is developing it. The Air Force is also considering the development of a rail-mobile ICBM, which could be hidden in innocently-looking, civilian-style railroad cars.

Myth #4: The entire nuclear arsenal is too expensive and siphons money away from other defense programs.

The facts: According to the Stimson Center, maintaining the US nuclear deterrent costs ca. $32–36 bn per year, including all the warheads, delivery systems, support facilities, personnel, and nuclear-related intelligence. This is a paltry 5.872% of the FY2013 military budget ($613 bn per the FY2013 NDAA). Modernizing the nuclear arsenal will, according to Stimson, cost up to $390 bn over the next decade, i.e. $39 bn per year on average. This is 6.4% of the FY2013 military budget. These are microscoping percentages.

So the US provides a large nuclear umbrella to itself and to over 30 allies at a cost of only 6% of its total military budget.

Furthermore, even if the ENTIRE nuclear arsenal were scrapped IMMEDIATELY and UNILATERALLY today, that would “save” a paltry $36 bn per year and thus fail to come even close to paying for sequestration, let alone balancing the federal budget.

No, the US nuclear arsenal is not siphoning money away from anything. As usual, it’s a scapegoat for liberals.

It is, in fact, other, more costly defense programs that are siphoning money away from nuclear deterrence and other defense priorities. For example, the development and acquisition of 2,400 short-range, understealthed, slow, sluggish F-35 strike jets will cost $400 bn. A single aircraft carrier costs $15 bn, yet is tragically vulnerable to ballistic and cruise missiles, submarines, and naval mines. Yet, the biggest cost drivers in the defense budget are personnel programs (pay, benefits, healthcare, retirement, etc.), which, unless seriously reformed, will consume the ENTIRE defense budget by no later than FY2039. That means no money for nuclear deterrence or for weapons of any kind.

And while F-35s and aircraft carriers are increasingly and prohibitively expensive, they’re also increasingly vulnerable and useless for the threat environments the US military will have to operate in. Meanwhile, the next generation bomber will be able to strike from well over the horizon – even the CONUS – and submarines have always been stealthy. USAF ICBMs sit in hardened siloes, can strike any place on the planet, and may be replaced by rail-mobile ones (see above).

Myth #5: Conventional weapons, missile defense systems, and cyberweapons can replace nuclear weapons in a very wide range of missions and scenarios and against the vast majority of targets.

The facts: Such claims are preposterous. None of these weapons have anything even close to the destructive, crippling power of atomic weapons.

Conventional weapons utterly lack such power. Even the most powerful conventional bombs – MOABs and the now-retired Daisy Cutters – have the explosive power approaching only that of the lowest-yield nuclear warheads, and MOAB is not even designed to penetrate anything.

Cyberweapons can shut down computer networks, but only temporarily, and can’t physically destroy anything. Buildings, vehicles, warships, aircraft, and humans will still exist. Cyberweapons can only complement other types of arms, but never replace them.

Nor can missile defense ever replace nuclear weapons. It has long been an article of faith among conservatives, including conservative think-tank analysts, that it can, but the truth is that it can’t. This truth will be uncomfortable for them, but my job as defense analysts is to tell people the truth, not what they want to hear.

Missile defense technology is still in its infancy. Moreover, one needs several interceptors to shoot down one missile. For example, to shoot down one Russian ICBM would take 7 ground-based interceptors of the type deployed in AK and CA. US missile defense systems (except the PATRIOT) have never been tested in massive missile barrages – the type of missile attacks the US will actually have to counter.

Furthermore, BMD systems’ ability to distinguish real warheads from decoys is yet unclear, and there are no systems available for boost-phase interception. But worst of all, BMD interceptors are far more expensive than the ballistic missiles they’re designed to intercept. A THAAD missile costs $9-10 mn; an SM-3, $10 mn; a ground-based interceptor, $70 mn. It is far cheaper to build and launch ballistic missiles than to intercept them. Furthermore, America’s enemies already have such huge inventories of BMs of all types – measured in thousands – that they are and will always be able to overwhelm American BMD systems through sheer numbers.

The best way to protect against missiles of any kind is to kill the archer, not the arrow. Only “offensive” systems – strike systems – can do that. This includes ICBMs, SLBMs, cruise missiles, bombers, and theater strike aircraft.

Myth #6: The fewer nuclear weapons the US has, the better; cutting America’s nuclear deterrent makes America safer.

The facts: These claims are also completely false. No nation in history has become more secure by disarming itself – whether uni-, bi-, or multilaterally. No nation in history has increased its security by indulging in arms reduction and disarmament – such policies have only weakened, and reduced the security of, the  nations practicing them.

Myth #6 is, in fact, an utter rejection of any principle or notion of deterrence or of peace through strength; it turns these principles upside down. Myth #6 is essentially a claim that weakness is good and leads to peace and security; that weakening one’s own military (and that’s what cutting its arsenals of weapons does – it weakens the military) makes one more secure and the world more peaceful.

Many variations of this myth have been uttered by the Left. For example, during the forementioned HASC Strategic Forces Subcommitteee hearing, its ranking member, Democrat Jim Cooper of Tennessee, an ardent enemy of nuclear weapons, claimed that the biggest cut in America’s nuclear deterrent – made by the elder President Bush in the early 1990s – was “a good thing”, that it made America and the world more secure and peaceful, and that this is supposedly shared by the “mainstream” of American opinion. Another strident leftist, John Garamendi (D-CA), claimed that “whatever we can do to cut nuclear arsenals – here, in North Korea, around the world”  is a good thing.

Their claims are blatant lies, of course. As I’ve already stated, no nation in history has become more secure by disarming itself, and America won’t be the first. President Bush’s deep unilateral cut in America’s deterrent is a textbook example of that. He cut the arsenal by almost half, withdrew US nuclear weapons from Korea and from surface warships unilaterally, terminated MX ICBM production and B-2 bomber production at just 21 aircraft, terminated the Midgetman SRBM, and terminated warhead production and testing.

Yet, no one else has reciprocated. Since then, China has dramatically increased its nuclear arsenal – to at least 1,800 and up to 3,000 warheads – while North Korea and Pakistan joined the nuclear club, India and these two countries have conducted nuclear tests, and Iran has made dramatic progress towards nuclear weapon capability. Russia has begun rebuilding and modernizing its arsenal.

So Bush’s deep nuclear cuts only weakened America’s deterrent (and confidence in it) while utterly failing to discourage others from developing or increasing their own arsenals. Two new states have joined the nuclear club, others have conducted tests, and Iran is well on its way there.

That’s because cutting America’s nuclear deterrent DOES NOTHING to prevent or even slow down nuclear proliferation or encourage others to disarm themselves. It is perceived (correctly) as a sign of American weakness and appeasement. It only emboldens America’s enemies while leading America’s allies to doubt the US umbrella. It does NOTHING, and will never do anything, to eliminate or even reduce the arsenals of other powers.

Other nuclear (and aspiring) powers don’t care about America’s “example” or observance of arms control treaties; they care only about their own military strength and see nuclear weapons as a key element of that. America has NO followers on the road to “Global Zero” – which other nuclear powers simply DON’T want to travel. Even Bruce Blair has admitted at 1:04:41 that even if the US totally disarmed itself, NO ONE would follow suit.

Thus, we have refuted all of the 6 most popular leftist lies about nuclear weapons. It is impossible (and not even necessary) to refute all myths that have been made about these crucial instruments of deterrence; and the vast majority of the lies about them fall under one of these 6 categories.

Nuclear weapons are NOT a threat to America’s or the world’s security; on the contrary, they are key to preserving it far into the future. They are irreplaceable instruments of peace and deterrence.

Let’s stop pretending that deep defense cuts can be done safely

In recent weeks, several organizations have put out proposals of various defense cuts which they claimed are informed by or based on some strategy. In a few cases, this is true, in other cases, it is not. These proposals of defense cuts follow earlier ones reviewed and refuted here on CDN and on my blog (see here).

The two latest reports proposing defense cuts and extrapolating on how to make them are the Stimson Center’s Strategic Agility and the RAND Corporation’s A Strategy-Based Framework for Accommodating Reductions in the Defense Budget. Both of them propose a defense posture and a strategy far different from the ones the DOD has so far operated under, and markedly different even from the new strategy the DOD announced in January of this year in response to the Budget Control Act’s spending cut mandates. Both of these strategies/blueprints claim that significant defense budget cuts/savings are possible if these strategies are adopted.

What Strategic Agility conveniently omits, however (while the Strategy-Based Framework admits it openly), is that the deep defense budget and force posture cuts presented therein would significantly weaken the US military and its ability to defend the US and its allies and invite much greater risk than that presently accepted by defense planners.

Let’s review both of these strategies in brief.

Strategic Agility claims that $400 bn per decade in efficiencies (such as significant reforms to military retirement and healthcare programs, acquisition system reform, and downsizing defense bureaucracies) is possible, but it doesn’t specify what those reforms and efficiencies would be. In case the Stimson Center hasn’t noticed, the DOD has already requested Congressional authorization for sweeping reforms to its retirement and healthcare programs – necessary to meet the initial BCA mandate to cut $487 bn out of the DOD’s budget over the next decade – and has been denied that authority by Congress.

Strategic Agility also calls for withdrawing almost all troops from the locations where they are permanently deployed and instead making rotational deployments to these locations, and most importantly, relying heavily on “expeditionary” capabilities – i.e. projecting military power from the US. Accordingly, they want most troops stationed abroad to be brought back to the States.

Stimson’s Barry Blechman says “We should shift over time from static deployments overseas in an evolutionary way to a more rotational system. Permanent presence in regions like the Middle East is a lightning rod for those who oppose us. It allows them to recruit supporters. It causes problems with local populations.”

But this is true only in the Middle East, where permanently stationed American troops are indeed viewed as occupiers. Nations in the Pacific Rim and in Europe, OTOH, welcome American troops and view them as as guaranteers of their security. This is especially true of Central European countries like Poland and the Czech Republic, two stalwart US allies who have suffered repeated foreign (usually Russian, in Poland’s case) aggression and which continue to be threatened by it. While Iran is threatening to wipe Israel off the map, most Americans don’t know that in 1795 Russia DID actually wipe Poland off the map for 123 years. Putin’s confrontational and aggressive foreign policy is a threat to European security, and only a permanent presence of US troops on Polish soil can reassure America’s Central European allies that they will never again be subjugated by Russia.

Similarly, America’s Pacific Rim allies very much want American troops to be stationed permanently on their soil and, like European allies, view American troops as their defenders, not occupiers. The only country that don’t welcome them are China and North Korea – precisely the aggressors America must defend its allies from. Rotational presence doesn’t reassure allies, nor does it allow the US military to train their militaries and build their capabilities to defend themselves. It is also more costly than bringing the troops home, building new bases for them in the US, and redeploying them rotationally every year or so.

Stimson’s proposal to rely on expeditionary capabilities is no panacea, either. These are currently shrinking due to the shrinkage of the Navy’s ship (including carrier) fleet and the USAF’s fleet of strategic and tactical airlifters. Just a few years ago, the USAF had 316 strategic airlifters. Now it has 301 and is due to retire another 26 this fiscal year. Stimson essentially wants to increase the burden on already overburnened expeditionary units.

Worst of all, though, Stimson proposes deep, reckless cuts to America’s nuclear deterrent: cutting the ICBM fleet from 450 to just 300, the ballistic missile submarine fleet from 14 to just 10, and not replacing the USAF’s unsurvivable B-52 nuclear bombers with new, stealthy aircraft. (Stimson supports the Next Generation Bomber, but wants it to be purely conventional.) This is reckless and unacceptable.

Such a cut would make the USAF’s ICBM fleet 134 missiles smaller than Russia’s (434 ICBMs), and it would be even weaker than these raw numbers indicate, because most Russian ICBMs can carry far more warheads than the Minuteman’s mere 3 tetes: the SS-18 Satan can carry ten (plus up to 30 countermeasures like decoys), the SS-19 Stiletto can carry six, and the SS-29 can carry four. The Russians are now developing a new heavy ICBM, “the Son of Satan”, due to enter service in 2018, which will carry as many warheads as the SS-18 Satan.

Similarly, the Russians are now building eight ballistic missile submarines due to replace eight older ones (of the Delta class). The first three will carry 16 SLBMs each, same as America’s planned SSBN replacement class, but Russian boats #4 through #8 will carry 20 SLBMs each, thus giving the Russian Navy an advantage over the USN in terms of missiles and warheads carried on these subs. Yet, Stimson wants to cut America’s SSBN fleet further, to just 10 boats with 16 missiles each, 2 boats fewer than what Russia has and will continue to have (excluding the Dmitry Donskoy SSBN, now serving as a test platform).

America’s nuclear arsenal is already barely adequate. Any further cuts to it are absolutely unacceptable.

So Stimson’s nuclear arsenal cuts proposals are reckless, and for that reason alone, their “strategy” is unacceptable.

RAND does not propose any specific strategy itself. Instead, it illustrates three different scenarios under which the size and capabilities of the military would be cut significantly if further defense budget cuts are made. Each of these scenarios is tied to a specific strategy.

The first one prioritizes the Army and the Marine Corps and would continue to prepare the military for persistent, protracted large-scale ground wars, such as those of the past. The second one would contract most defense responsibilites to America’s allies, without regard for their ability to assume them (most of them are either deeply in debt or, in the case of Central European countries, too poor to defend themselves on their own). The third strategy assumes that the US will have to play the lead role in some regions of the world, but only in the most important ones, and  contract responsibility for securing other regions to allies, while focusing on the most important (through the prism of American national interests) parts of the world: the Pacific Rim and the Persian Gulf. Accordingly, the third strategy would prioritize the capabilities most relevant for winning in the Pacific Rim and the Gulf, while cutting back on less essential capabilities, and prioritize long-range strike and striking from over the horizon. This means putting a premium on the Navy and the Air Force.

Thus, the cutbacks to the military’s force structure under these three different scenarios would be (quoting directly from RAND, A Strategy Based Framework…, pp. 38-39):

“I: Prepare for Persistent Conflict Force Structure Reductions
Savings Initiative:
• No cuts to Army
• No cuts to Marine Corps
• Reduce Navy by 30 percent, including retiring three CSGs
• Reduce Air Force by 10 percent, including retiring two active TFWs.

II: Cede More Responsibility to Allies and Partners Force Structure Reductions
Savings Initiative:
• Reduce Army by two BCTs
• Reduce Marine Corps end strength by 13,500 Marines and 2 active tactical
fighter squadrons
• Reduce Navy by 20 percent, including retiring two CSGs
• Reduce Air Force by 10 percent, including retiring two active TFWs.

III: Shift Geostrategic Focus to the Western Pacific Force Structure Reductions
Savings Initiative:
• Reduce Army by six BCTs
• Reduce Marine Corps end strength by 13,500 Marines and 2 active tactical
fighter squadrons
• Reduce Navy by 5 percent, including retiring 15 combatants
• Reduce Air Force by 5 percent, including retiring one active TFW”

The first and second scenario would make devastating and probably irreparable cuts to the Navy and Air Force, and the second would also make some (albeit smaller) cuts to the Army and the Marines, while the first would spare the ground force from any further cuts. Both the first and the second scenario would, in short, significantly weaken the US military and its ability to defend America and its allies.

Only the third strategy is suited to the kind of wars America will be fighting in the future and the geographic theaters where these wars will be fought (which will be predominantly maritime). Only the third strategy prioritizes, and mostly preserves, the capabilities and the kind of units and assets needed to prevail in such wars.

That is because almost all future wars – whether against China, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, or Syria – will be fought predominantly in the air and at sea, NOT on the ground, thus requiring that priority status be accorded to airpower and seapower. Moreover, such wars will put a premium on survivable assets (such as stealthy aircraft, air/missile defense warships, and submarines) and on long-range strike platforms (e.g. the Next Generation Bomber and future carrier-based UCAVs), while ground troops will play only a marginal role. Thus, small additional ground force reductions could be made, although the Marine Corps cuts that RAND proposes would go too far. A better idea would be to move many Army brigades to the reserve component and for the USMC to divest itself of capabilities and assets that other services can provide.

Moreover, it is in America’s interest to avoid being drawn into any new large-scale or protracted ground wars, and such wars are politically impossible these days, anyway, because American voters are war-weary. As then-SECDEF Robert Gates said in 2011, any future SECDEF who again advises the President to send another American ground army to Asia or the Middle East should have his head reexamined.

RAND’s strategy for the third (Pacific/maritime) scenario is not flawless, however. It calls for a further cut of 15 ships from the Navy and retiring one additional Tactical Fighter Wing from the Air Force. This would weaken America’s seapower and airpower, which will be so crucial in the Pacific and the Persian Gulf, where every ship will matter, especially large surface combatants. Moreover, ships and planes are much harder to produce again once production lines have closed, so cuts in the Navy and the USAF are hard to reverse, unlike cuts in the ground force. To pay for protecting the Navy and the USAF, the DOD could, for example, delay or cancel the Ground Combat Vehicle program and move 50% of the Army’s heavy brigades to the reserve component.

Overall, RAND’s Strategy #3 is relatively the best suited of all “strategies” bandied so far by anyone to the threats of the future. Even that strategy, however, has its flaws, as it would still cut further (although not deeply) the very services crucial for defeating these threats and winning the wars of the future.